Monday mayhem unspool security and intelligence riddle 

Maoists used forces’ walkie-talkie to keep track

Vijay Deo Jha

Ranchi

The Latehar slaughter has exposed the many faultlines that riddles the government’s offensive against Maoists in a single stunning knock.

The most significant of them is perhaps the widely suspected fact which police establishment denies. It is the strategic movement of forces, which was probably leaked or Maoists had prior access. The post-mayhem analysis of lapses and lacunae during and before operation indicates Maoists were well prepared.

Forces just ventured into a trap and became easy meat for a Maoist contingent nearly 300-strong occupying high vintage points with war weapons like Light Machine Guns. It couldn’t be that nobody in the Amuatiker locality knew of the detailed arrangements for the mass murder. It is something indicating poor ground intelligence resulting in to the killing of 10 CPRF and one Jharkhand Jaguar personnel and three civilians.

The pattern of trap and killing was distinctly close to 2010 Sukma episode of the Chhattisgarh where 76 CRPF personnel were butchered. Security bosses analyzing episodes with the help of recorded intra-group-communications security forces that day — January 7, they realized Maoists had intercepted forces’ communication line. Maoists had seized a walkie-talkie from a dead jawan.

“We lost one walkie-talkie but not during operation. Maoists were not able to track our movement,” IG (Operations) SN Pradhan said.

A top official confided when forces were communicating among themselves over walkie-talkie about their missing colleagues after attack; the audio records had background noises suggesting Maoists coordinating and repositioning their armed groups to chase forces.

“Charlie hamare 17 log missing hain (Charlie our 17 people are missing),” forces heard communicating while informing about their move in certain direction.

“Force tumhare taraf jaa raha hai udhar se ghero…gazar muli ki tarah kaat denge (Forces are moving towards you. Trap them from that side…we shall butcher them),” a Maoist directed the striking group. It has a close resemblance with the Sukma case where forces missed one of their walkie-talkies, during Long Range Operation, even without noticing the loss. Maoists lay their hands on the set and tracked and trapped forces a couple of days later.

A top Jharkhand police officer admitted as much to the Pioneer, affirming that intelligence was quite poor. “It is resulted due to poor ground intelligence of police, CRPF, IB and others. What we get is often incorrect and too little. Latehar is a case of double cross. Forces acted and marched in haste.”

But Pradhan contradicted it. “We had information about presence of Maoists in the hillock area. We were caught at the entry point,” he said. But security forces had inputs about only 40 to 50 whereas Maoists were 300 in number. “Using LMG itself indicates plan for a bigger action because LMG is known for long and lethal strike. It makes no sense frontline boys were sent without bullet proof jackets,” a security expert said.

Pradhan though pleaded not enough bullet proof jackets were available. But Jharkhand DGP GS Rath added difficult terrain and bad weather as another reason that multiplied the tragedy. Rath displayed the mood that scores will be settled. Most of the Latehar’s forest is a great unknown wilderness that has now turned into Maoists’ de facto headquarters after being flushed out from Saranda. The problem is that forces are better monitored by Maoists than the other way round. Maoists are insiders in more ways than one; the government and forces is the outsider.